With the onset of hostilities between the United States (US) and Iran, American military installations in the Middle East have come under sustained attack and suffered significant damage.[i] This has been accompanied by equipment losses,[ii] and dwindling munitions.[iii] Given this context, the Pentagon has begun discussing possible withdrawals, ranging from permanently closing bases, shifting forces west of the Persian Gulf, or moving the US military presence into Israel.[iv] These policy suggestions call for rupturing long-term American agreements with its Arab allies, implicitly invoking changed circumstances from the Iran war.
The question arises whether these changes are sufficient under international law to invoke such a rupture. The principle that changed circumstances can justify terminating an agreement has long been part of customary international law, embodied in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).[v] Article 62 (Fundamental Change of Circumstances) permits withdrawal when there is (1) an unforeseen change, (2) the original circumstances were an essential basis of consent, (3) the change radically transforms obligations still to be performed, and (4) the change did not flow from a breach by the invoking party towards a treaty participant.[vi] The US is not a party to the VCLT, but this principle is customary international law,[vii] applicable to the US if it has expressed recognition of it.[viii] This recognition is easily met by American diplomatic practice stretching back to the Second World War.[ix]
The scope of Fundamental Change of Circumstances is narrow in contemporary international law. The ICJ has explained that the change must affect a “fundamental or vital [interest]… which imperil[s] the existence or vital development of one of the parties.”[x] Changes to the political situation are relevant, but the original situation must be closely linked to the treaty’s object and purpose, serve as an essential basis of consent, and its change must drastically alter obligations to be performed.[xi] Since the ICJ last discussed this principle, it has been invoked twice: by the ECC and Poland.
The ECC in 1991 invoked the principle to suspend a tariff agreement with Yugoslavia, as the country had collapsed into civil war.[xii] The Court of Justice of the European Communities ruled this was proper, as the maintenance of peace and a government capable of implementing the agreement were essential conditions of consent, and the agreement’s socioeconomic goals could no longer be attained.[xiii]
Poland utilized the principle after adopting its 1997 constitution to cancel Cold War agreements based on Marxist Leninist principles.[xiv] Poland sent termination notifications to seven countries, citing the incompatibility of Marxist obligations and purposes with Poland’s new political situation.[xv] Cambodia and Mongolia explicitly agreed, Laos, Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, tacitly accepted, and Cuba claimed its treaty had already expired, with no state contesting Poland’s argument.[xvi]
Given this limited scope, US use of this principle for regional withdrawals would require a radical shift from the original conditions that created these US basing agreements. These conditions originated in the 1990s, when the United States was the primary guarantor of Gulf State security and oil flows, seeking to unify the Gulf States into a pro-Western bloc capable of balancing Iranian power, and was the dominant military power in the region.[xvii] This resulted in a series of Defense Cooperation Agreements establishing the modern American presence, whose full extent is classified,[xviii] but whose obligations encompassed military cooperation and consultation.[xix] The only exception is Qatar, where President Trump issued an executive order extending a formal security guarantee to the country.[xx]
Today, conditions have drastically changed. The United States suffers from significant military material shortages, has had much of its basing architecture destroyed, and it can no longer guarantee the security of its own installations, let alone its Arab Allies and their oil flows.[xxi] Its ability to counterbalance Iranian power has rapidly declined. This represents a fundamental geopolitical shift from the conditions that created the US-Arab alliances, that was unforeseeable in the 1990s, and has significantly changed American obligations, as continuing the status quo would invite further unsustainable warfare.
This geopolitical change meets the close connection criteria the ICJ requires between a changing political situation, an agreement’s object, purpose, and consent conditions, and a drastic shift in obligations. It mirrors the ECC and Polish invocations, reflecting the rapid change in the security situation in the ECC/Yugoslavia case, and a major geopolitical change as seen in the Polish case. Furthermore, the change did not flow from a US breach of an international obligation towards a treaty participant, as US actions against Iran did not breach any agreement made with its various Arab allies.
On balance, the American case for military withdrawals under this argument is strong. The biggest difficulty is justifying these changes as being of a fundamental or vital interest. This requires showing that the continued maintenance of the basing architecture would imperil the US military apparatus, through ongoing equipment losses and munition depletion, and its domestic economy, through the effects of the fighting in the Gulf on the international energy market. Qatar presents the most difficult case, as high war burdens are typically foreseeable under a security guarantee. Yet, this guarantee is in the form of a domestic executive order, not an international treaty obligation, making it revocable by the sitting president.[xxii] However, for the other agreements that lack a formal defensive pact, this argument is stronger, as the change in obligations to be performed is drastic.
Christian Wuerthner is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume L.
[i] See generally Ashleigh Fields, Report: Iran has Caused Billions in Damage to US Military Bases in Gulf Region, Tʜᴇ Hɪʟʟ (Apr. 26, 2026), https://thehill.com/policy/international/5849646-iran-damage-us-military-bases/ (detailing the extensive damage caused to U.S. military installations in the Gulf States as of April 2026); Federica Marsi, ‘Blew the Hell Out of it’: How Iran Damaged US bases in Bahrain, Jordan, Aʟ Jᴀᴢᴇᴇʀᴀ (Sept. 11, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/11/blew-the-hell-out-of-it-how-iran-damaged-us-bases-in-bahrain-jordan (detailing extensive damage to the US military base in Bahrain, alleged damage caused by Iranian attacks on U.S. bases in Jordan, and other Iranian attacks within the region).
[ii] See Jaffa Levy, Iran’s Radar War: How the Destruction of Gulf Sensor Networks Is Blinding U.S. Missile Defense, The Telegraph (Mar. 8, 2026), https://telegraph.com/iran-radar-war-blinding-us-missile-defence/ (detailing confirmed and alleged American radar and air defense losses during the first few weeks of the Iran war); Ben Finley & Farnoush Amiri, US Watchdog Tallies Iran War’s Hit to Weapons Stockpiles, Military Bases and More, Associated Press (Sept. 14, 2026), https://apnews.com/article/iran-war-damage-pentagon-inspector-general-87cbe4e2ac208a849cd1554c4bb44bbf (discussing the recent Pentagon Inspector General report on the Iran war, including lost and damaged aircraft).
[iii] See Mark F. Cancian & Chris H. Park, Six Reasons Why the United States Is Low on Munitions, Ctr. For Strategic & Int’l Stud. (July 31, 2026), https://www.csis.org/analysis/six-reasons-why-united-states-low-munitions (discussing the dwindling of air defense and long range strike munitions for American forces as of the end of July).
[iv] See generally Noah Robertson, John Hudson & Susannah George, Pentagon Weighing Smaller U.S. Military Presence in Gulf Once Iran War Ends, Wᴀꜱʜ. Pᴏꜱᴛ (Aug. 18, 2026), https://www.yahoo.com/news/politics/articles/pentagon-weighing-smaller-us-military-presence-in-gulf-once-iran-war-ends-151303899.html (describing ongoing discussions among senior American military leadership about possible changes to the U.S. military presence in the Middle East).
[v] See Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Eighteenth Session, at 256-57, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1 (1966) (explaining how a change of circumstances has long been a way to withdrawal from an international agreement under customary international law, and how this will be incorporated into the VCLT under the Article for Fundamental Change of Circumstances).
[vi] See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 62, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) (codifying Fundamental Change of Circumstances in the VCLT under Article 62).
[vii] See Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Eighteenth Session, supra note 5, at 256-7.
[viii] See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 183-85 (June 27) (explaining how a customary international law applies to a state via its practice and opinio juris of that law, and how this criterion is meet by various instances of a state expressly invoking or recognizing the validity of that law).
[ix] See Proclamation No. 2500 – Suspending the International Load Lines Convention in Ports and Waters of the United States, (1941), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-2500-suspending-the-international-load-lines-convention-ports-and-waters-the (invoking the principle of Fundamental Change of Circumstances to suspend the International Load Lines Convention). See also John M. Steeves, Political Adviser to the Commander in Chief, Pacific, to the Special Assistant for Political and Military Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Green), July 22, 1958, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume 1: Vietnam, Document 24, (Washington: Government Printing Office), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v01/d24 (discussing how Fundamental Change of Circumstances could allow the U.S. to escape an agreement that may violate the Geneva Accords and would soon require the U.S. to perform unforeseen economic and military obligations); Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 313a (A. L. I. 2018) (stating that the U.S. follows those provisions of the VCLT that it considers to reflect customary international law, with the U.S. considering the provisions on suspending, terminating, or withdrawing from a treaty to reflect this law).
[x] See Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), Judgment, 1973 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 38 (Feb. 2) (discussing the requirements for a successful invocation of the principle of Fundamental Change of Circumstances while not ruling on the merits of its invocation by Iceland in this case).
[xi] See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 104 (Sept. 25).
[xii] See Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1998 E.C.R. I-03655, ¶ 8.
[xiii] Id. at 54.
[xiv] See TREŚĆ Aneksu do 16. posiedzenia Sejmu w dniach 25, 26 i 27 kwietnia 2006 r. część 2 [Content of the Annex to the 16th Sitting of the Sejm on 25, 26 and 27 April 2006, part 2], at 417–20 (Pol.).
[xv] Id. at 419.
[xvi] Id. at 419-20.
[xvii] See Warren Chin, Brandon Friedman, & Andrew Stewart, Geostrategic Gulf: From World Wars to Modern Day 89, 160 (2026).
[xviii] See Keneth Katzman, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS21852, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy 18 (2018) https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/PDF/RS21852/RS21852.108.pdf [hereinafter Katzman, UAE] (describing how the full Defense Cooperation Agreement between the U.S. and the UAE is classified). See also Kenneth Katzman, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RS21513, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy 8 (2019) https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/RS/PDF/RS21513/RS21513.121.pdf [hereinafter Katzman, Kuwait] (describing how the full Defense Cooperation Agreement between the U.S. and Kuwait is classified).
[xix] See generally Katzman, UAE, supra note xviii (stating U.S. military cooperation and consultation obligations with the UAE); Katzman, Kuwait, supra note xviii (describing U.S. military cooperation and consultation obligations with Kuwait); U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Security Cooperation With Saudi Arabia (May 8, 2025), https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-saudi-arabia/ (stating U.S. military cooperation and consultation obligations with Saudi Arabia); Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., art. II, Sept. 13, 2023, T.I.A.S. No. 23-1020 (describing U.S. military cooperation and consultation obligations with Bahrain); Defense Cooperation Agreement, U.S.-Jordan, Preamble, Jan. 31, 2021, T.I.A.S. No. 21-317 (stating that the military relationship between the U.S. and Jordan arises out of a shared approach to regional security and stability).
[xx] See Exec. Order No. 14,353, 90 Fed. Reg. 48143, 48143 (Sep. 29, 2025) (stating that the U.S. will regard any armed attack on the territory, sovereignty, or critical infrastructure of Qatar as a threat to the peace and security of the U.S., requiring a U.S. response).
[xxi] See Isabel Wang & Myra P. Saefong, Here’s a Look at the Known Damage to Gulf Energy Facilities as the U.S. and Iran Meet for Talks, Morningstar (Apr. 11, 2026), https://www.morningstar.com/news/marketwatch/20260411155/heres-a-look-at-the-known-damage-to-gulf-energy-facilities-as-the-us-and-iran-meet-for-talks (discussing damage to Gulf State energy infrastructure and oil flows as of April 2026).
[xxii] See Cong. Rsch. Serv., IF12724, Executive Orders and Presidential Transitions (2024) https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/PDF/IF12724/IF12724.2.pdf (explaining how each president is free to amend, repeal, or replace any executive order).
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.