The Essequibo region was formally recognized as part of British Guyana through the 1899 Paris Arbitral, a decision reached between the British on behalf of the then-colony of Guyana, and the United States as a representative for Venezuela.[i] The agreement stood until 1962, when Venezuela challenged the land grant in light of Guyana’s newfound independence.[ii] The nations reached an agreement in 1966 that allows the UN Secretary-General to select a means of dispute resolution under Article 33 of the UN Charter.[iii] In 2018, it was determined that the proper forum for this dispute if a resolution could not be found would be the International Court of Justice (ICJ).[iv]
While the region has been the subject of dispute since colonial times, efforts by Venezuela to annex Essequibo have been reignited with particular force following the boom of Guyana’s oil industry in 2015, making it the fastest growing economy in the world.[v] Tensions rose to an all-time high when, in 2023, then-President Maduro of Venezuela created a new role on the ballot, a representative role for what he referred to as “Guayana Esequiba.”[vi] With this proposal President Maduro actively laid a claim to 60% of the recognized territory of Guyana.[vii] Additionally, a referendum was held which asked Venezuelan citizens (1) whether “Guyana Esequiba” should be incorporated as a Venezuelan state and (2) whether Venezuela should reject the ICJ’s jurisdiction in the dispute.[viii] During this time, Maduro also released new maps of Venezuela which included the Essequibo territory.[ix] The international community responded quickly to the elections, with the ICJ ruling that Venezuela “must refrain from conducting elections for Essequibo” while the dispute is still active.[x]
Oral argument in Guyana v. Venezuela was heard in May of 2026 following Guyana’s submission to the ICJ requesting recognition of the territories as they had been established in 1899.[xi] Following oral arguments, Acting President Delcy Rodríguez of Venezuela told the ICJ that “There is no legal way of recognising a decision resulting from this process, whatever that may be.”[xii]
Under Article 94 of the UN Charter, decisions by the ICJ are final and binding.[xiii] Additionally, as a court of last resort, an ICJ decision may not be appealed, only clarified or interpreted.[xiv] If Venezuela fails to accept the ICJ ruling in this matter, it is likely that the diplomatic and economic repercussions would be substantial. For example, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has maintained good relations with Venezuela for decades, further solidified through the CARICOM Venezuela Trade and Investment Agreement (2006).[xv] However, in light of the ICJ’s deliberations, CARICOM released a statement in support of Guyana’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, reminding members to remain mindful of their treaty obligations under international law.[xvi] The United States similarly came out in support of Guyana’s territorial integrity against threats of annexation.[xvii] Brazil, a nation with strong diplomatic relations with both Guyana and Venezuela, has called for a peaceful solution while explicitly rejecting the use of force by Venezuela in 2023 and in the future of this dispute.[xviii]
Beyond the individual repercussions that Venezuela can experience as a result of ignoring the ICJ’s ruling, it is imperative that member states uphold international law, especially in border disputes. If Venezuela rejects the ICJ’s ruling, it is blatantly violating the UN Charter, the backbone of cooperation between nation states.[xix] An original founding member state doing so would offend international law and cooperation and set a negative precedent in the international community. Regardless of the conclusion the ICJ arrives at within the year, it is in the best interest of all parties involved to respect the findings of the ICJ.
Tiffany Ali is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume L.
[i] See Zaid Darraj, The Essequibo Territorial Dispute: A New Proxy War?, Dallas/Fort Worth World Affairs Council, https://www.dfwworld.org/the-essequibo-territorial-dispute-a-new-proxy-war/.
[ii] See Ryan Shaw, Crisis on the Essequibo: The Implications of Venezuelan Aggression Towards Guyana as Non-Compliance with ICJ Provisional Measures, Mich. j. int’l l. blog (December 2024), https://www.mjilonline.org/crisis-on-the-essequibo-the-implications-of-venezuelan-aggression-towards-guyana-as-non-compliance-with-icj-provisional-measures/.
[iii] See id.
[iv] See id.
[v] See Jolyn Debuysscher, Guyana and Venezuela: Tensions Over Essequibo Region Defused After Mediation but Century-Old Dispute Is Not Settled and Will Continue to Simmer, Credendo (Feb. 1, 2024), https://credendo.com/en/knowledge-hub/guyana-and-venezuela-tensions-over-essequibo-region-defused-after-mediation-century; see also Anuz Thapa, How Guyana’s big oil boom turned it into the world’s fastest-growing economy, cnb (Jan. 27, 2024), https://www.cnbc.com/2024/01/27/how-guyanas-big-oil-boom-turned-it-into-the-worlds-fastest-growing-economy.html.
[vi] See Catherine Ellis, Borders, Ballots and Boycotts: How the disputed region of Essequibo factors into Venezuela’s 2025 elections, al jazeera (May 23, 2025), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/longform/2025/5/23/borders-and-ballots-why-essequibo-is-controversial-in-venezuelas-election.
[vii] See id.
[viii] See Mandy Loader, Essequibo, Encyc. Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/Essequibo (last visited Oct, 6, 2026).
[ix] See Mark Bassant, Maduro releases new map of Venezuela, claiming Essequibo Region, Trinidad express (Dec. 6, 2023), https://trinidadexpress.com/newsextra/maduro-releases-new-map-of-venezuela-claiming-essequibo-region/article_a7a41546-9415-11ee-ba3f-d34160300660.html.
[x] See Ellis, supra note 6.
[xi] See Molly Quell, Guyana and Venezuela return to UN court to settle historic dispute over valuable border region, Associated press (May 4, 2026), https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-guyana-essequibo-border-dispute-icj-hague-2c9d13b0dbcf7f92d6f53264003ce626; see also Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Arbitral Award of 3 October 1899 (Guyana v. Venezuela), I.C.J. Press Release No. 2026/11(Apr. 23, 2026), https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/171/171-20260423-pre-01-00-enc.pdf (Venezuela’s objection to ICJ jurisdiction in the matter was rejected).
[xii] See Jovani Davis, Venezuela Rejects ICJ Authority in Guyana Border Dispute as Hearings Conclude, Caribbean nat’l wkly (May 12, 2026), https://www.caribbeannationalweekly.com/posts/venezuela-rejects-icj-authority-in-guyana-border-dispute-as-hearings-conclude.
[xiii] See generally I.C.J., Frequently Asked Questions, https://www.icj-cij.org/frequently-asked-questions.
[xiv] See id.
[xv] See Agreement on Trade and Investment, CARICOM–Venez., Oct. 13, 1992, https://www.foreign.gov.bb/the-caricom-venezuela-trade-and-investment-agreement/.
[xvi] See Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Statement from the Caribbean Community (Apr. 28, 2026), https://caricom.org/statement-from-the-caribbean-community/.
[xvii] See US Throws Weight Behind Guyana in Territorial Dispute With Venezuela, Al Jazeera (Dec. 7, 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/7/us-throws-weight-behind-guyana-in-territorial-dispute.
[xviii] See Anthony Boadle & Rodrigo Viga Gaier, Brazil Urging Venezuela to Avoid Force or Threats Against Guyana, Says Lula Aide, reuters (Dec. 6, 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/brazil-sees-no-risk-armed-conflict-between-guyana-venezuela-minister-2023-12-06/.
[xix] See U.N. Charter art. 94 ¶ 1.
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.