Confronting the Deforestation of the Amazon Rainforest: Obstacles to Achieving Multilateral Enforcement

South American countries have long been struggling to protect the Amazon rainforest. In addition to the Amazon rainforest’s invaluable role in climate regulation, it is also home to indigenous communities and one of the most biodiverse ecosystems on the planet.[1] For the last quarter-century, the international community has recognized the value of the Amazon rainforest and the existential threat that unbridled economic development poses to it. Over the past half century,17% of Amazon has been totally destroyed, and the degree of rainforest degradation is greater than that amount.[2]

The Amazon basin countries (Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Suriname, and Venezuela) have long tried to address the degradation of the rainforest, with varying results.[3] At the 2021 COP26 summit in Glasgow, six Amazon basin countries pledged to end deforestation in their countries by 2030.[4] While Brazil has made significant process under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (deforestation rates reached their lowest level since 2016), Bolivia’s rates of deforestation have since risen.[5] Given that Bolivia declined to commit to ending deforestation at the COP26 Summit, this result is unsurprising.[6]

Uneven efforts and results in rainforest preservation policies spurred Brazilian President Lula da Silva to convene eight other presidents last year in Belém to commit to curbing rampant deforestation in Brazil.[7] This summit, the Belém Agreement, represents the latest attempt in achieving multilateral enforcement.[8] While the Agreement is a heartening reflection of the countries’ willingness to participate in multilateral solutions, it is unclear if the Agreement transcends the issues that prevent previous international frameworks from successfully imposing anti-deforestation policies.[9]

First, there is the issue of governance. On the one hand, international frameworks for regulating the Amazon rainforest raise the perennial question whether local enforcement is preferable over international enforcement.[10] This debate inevitably entangles questions about sovereignty and a country’s sustainable development goals. On the other hand, the Belém Agreement commitments vary too much, and implementation capacity is dubious.[11]

Second, economic and political crises in Latin America prevent reliable long-term cooperation and commitment towards rainforest conservation methods.[12] For instance, Venezuela’s current economic and political crises reduce its ability to enforce conservation policies, and Bolivia’s dollar crisis is unlikely to subside any time soon.[13] Moreover, the economic crises in both countries have encouraged illegal activities and eroded the rule of law.[14] Additionally, political instability in the region further impedes reliable cooperation and commitment: for instance, Bolivia has experienced two coups and three presidencies within the last five years.[15] In that time, some political leaders were keener about restricting agricultural exploitation in forested areas than others.[16]

Third, Amazonian multilateral treaties suffer from lack of funding that would otherwise incentivize a more even adherence of treaty commitments.[17] Modern financing mechanisms for climate agreements include funding from developed countries, but these nations may be hesitant to invest in international climate funds without assurances of effective enforcement in multilateral frameworks.[18] As a result, they are likely to continue working only with specific countries (Norway and Guyana, for example) in lieu of contributing to broader agreements.[19] This practice is not a bad thing per se: it could foster local governance, empower indigenous communities as environmental stewards, and promote sustainable development. This approach resulted in successful enforcement mechanisms in Brazil and Ecuador.[20] However, it also risks leaving multilateral efforts underfunded and inefficient. Thus, Amazon basin countries are stuck in a catch-22: Without stable international financing to uphold multilateral commitments, countries lack incentive to commit to uniform enforcement, but without a well-functioning multilateral framework, there will be few financial backers willing to fund them.

An interesting but potentially problematic method as an alternative to hesitant funders is to support a multilateral Amazonian conservation framework through “debt-for-nature swaps.” These financial arrangements result in the forgiveness or restructuring of a portion of a country’s debt in exchange for commitments to environmental conservation efforts.[21] Debt-for-nature swaps have yielded positive results in various countries.[22] Costa Rica and Ecuador have worked with the United States and private banks, respectively, to forgive debt to owed them in exchange for conservation programs.[23] In South America, many of the Amazon basin countries — Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia — owe external debt to China.[24] Yet others, such as Brazil, owe debt to international financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund.[25] These entities are positioned to implement debt-for-nature swaps for a multilateral fund. However, tying multilateral environmental conservation to a country’s external debts may raise serious governance concerns.

The Amazon basin countries face substantial challenges towards developing an effective multilateral framework for rainforest conservation, chief among them national socioeconomic crises that make enforcement difficult, if not impossible. However, the international community can leverage financial tools to create incentives to build a well-functioning multilateral framework. The Amazon’s continued survival may depend on it.

Sheena Qiao is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLVIII.

[1] L.V. Gatti, et al., Amazonia as a Carbon Source Linked to Deforestation and Climate Change, 595 Nature 388, 388–93 (2021); Yadvinder Malhi, et al., Climate Change, Deforestation, and the Fate of the Amazon, 319 Science 169, 169–72 (2008).

[2] Manuela Andreoni & Max Bearak, Amazon Countries, Led by Brazil, Sign a Rainforest Pact, N.Y. Times (Aug. 8, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/08/climate/amazon-rainforest-belem-protections.html.

[3] Id.

[4] See id.

[5] Fabiano Maisonnave, Deforestation in Brazil’s Amazon Rainforest is Down to Lowest Level Since 2016, Government Says, Associated Press (Aug. 8, 2024), https://apnews.com/article/amazon-deforestation-marina-silva-rainforest-climate-cerrado-77079e3beaf5d39aebcc8ac93fa66d97; Bolivia, Global Forest Watch, https://www.globalforestwatch.org/dashboards/country/BOL/?category=summary&location=WyJjb3VudHJ5IiwiQk9MIl0%3D&map=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&showMap=true (last visited Nov. 27, 2024).

[6] Andreoni & Bearak, supra note 2.

[7] Id.

[8] Id.

[9] See id.

[10] Maria Antonia Tigre, Regional Cooperation in Amazonia: A Comparative Environmental Law Analysis, at 357 (2017).

[11] Andreoni & Bearak, supra note 2.

[12] Luisa Palacios, In Venezuela’s Election, Energy and Climate Policies are Also at Stake, Am. Q. (July 24, 2024), https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/in-venezuelas-election-energy-and-climate-policies-are-also-at-stake.

[13] Id.; Fernando Molina, Bolivia Looks to China Amid its First Economic Crisis in Two Decades, El País (June 22, 2023, 12:05 PM), https://english.elpais.com/international/2023-06-22/bolivia-looks-to-china-amid-its-first-economic-crisis-in-two-decades.html.

[14] ¿Un millón de dólares o bolivianos? Policías de Tránsito aprehendidos por robo de dinero, Los Tiempos (Jan. 1, 2024, 10:47 PM), https://www.lostiempos.com/actualidad/seguridad/20240115/millon-dolares-bolivianos-policias-transito-aprehendidos-robo-dinero (reporting on Bolivian law enforcement officials trafficking U.S. dollars).

[15] Milan Sime Martinic, Latin America in Turmoil: Bolivia’s Slide to Instability, Week (Nov. 23, 2023, 10:15 PM), https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2023/11/23/latin-america-in-turmoil-bolivias-slide-to-instability.html.

[16] Id.

[17] Tigre, supra note 10, at 493.

[18] Id. at 501.

[19] Id. at 502.

[20] Id. at 491–515.

[21] Climate finance: What are debt-for-nature swaps and how can they help countries?, World Econ. F. (Apr. 26, 2024), https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/04/climate-finance-debt-nature-swap.

[22] Marc Jones & Rodrigo Campos, Ecuador Seals Record Debt-for-Nature Swap with Galapagos Bond, Reuters (May 9, 2023, 5:23 PM), https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/ecuador-seals-record-debt-for-nature-swap-with-galapagos-bond-2023-05-09.

[23] Id.; see also Brijesh Thapa, The relationship between debt-for-nature swaps and protected area tourism: a plausible strategy for developing countries, U.S. Dep’t Agric. (2000), https://research.fs.usda.gov/treesearch/21956.

[24] Molina, supra note 13; see also Margaret Myers et al., How does debt affect Ecuador-China relations?, Dialogue (Oct. 18, 2024), https://thedialogue.org/analysis/how-does-debt-affect-ecuador-china-relations; Matt Ferchen, China, Venezuela, and the Illusion of Debt-Trap Diplomacy, Carnegie Endowment for Int’l Peace (Aug. 16, 2018), https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/10/china-venezuela-and-the-illusion-of-debt-trap-diplomacy?lang=en.

[25] Total IMF Credit Outstanding Movement From November 01, 2024 to November 08, 2024, Int’l Monetary Fund, https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/balmov2.aspx?type=TOTAL (last visited Nov. 8, 2024).

This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.