The U.S. Has Finally Declared Genocide in Sudan: Why Did It Take So Long to Get Here and What Comes Next?
On January 7, 2025, U.S. Secretary of State Blinken declared that Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF) committed genocide amid the country’s ongoing civil war.[1] This comes 18 months after the RSF and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) began their violent power struggle,[2] creating the world’s largest humanitarian crisis. Over 12 million people are displaced, 638,000 face catastrophic hunger, and more than half of Sudan’s 50 million people need life-saving aid. [3] The conflict has also been marked by ethnic cleansing, murder, and widespread sexual violence of civilian populations. [4]
The United States also imposed sanctions on RSF leader Hemedti along with several RSF-owned companies within the United Arab Emirates as part of this declaration, yet critics say that these actions come too little too late.[5] This is unsurprising, as human rights groups and activists have reported atrocities in Sudan since the conflict began in April 2023, but international public outcry has been minimal.[6] Why is this the case? And what avenues under international law can help advance peace in Sudan?
The international response to Sudan’s war has been limited for several reasons. The conflict, framed as a civil war between two military factions, complicates the question of international alignment—further muddied by both the RSF and SAF having committed war crimes against civilians, diminishing public focus. Additionally, specific targeting of journalists have hampered their ability to report on the ground, [7] leaving the task of documentation to human rights reporters who face significant risks.[8] And yet, another key factor in the international community's weak response is the extensive foreign influence fueling and prolonging Sudan's civil war.[9] States such as Russia, the UAE, and Turkey (among others) have felt free to support the RSF and SAF through supplying weapons, aid, military training, and more for their own unique objective in the conflict, and have largely gone unchecked by the international community in doing so.[10]
The U.S. imposing economic sanctions on RSF-owned companies could mark the start of a coordinated effort to disrupt RSF and SAF’s international economic networks.[11] However, it fails to address why state involvement in the war has gone unchecked. If states can influence conflicts without accountability, leading to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis, the root problem lies in the absence of a strong international legal regime enforcing state responsibility.
The UAE, a U.S. ally, has supplied weapons and logistics to the RSF, [12] but now claims it will cease support—despite previous denials of involvement.[13] President Biden has pledged to assess these claims and report to Congress by January 17, [14] in response to legislation proposing a halt to U.S. arms sales to the UAE. [15] If the UAE’s assurances fall short, strengthening accountability for states supporting military or paramilitary groups could serve as crucial leverage to deter further interference and prolongation of the conflict.
International courts use two tests to attribute wrongful acts to states.[16] In Tadić, the ICTY Appeals Chamber applied the “overall control” test to organized groups like military or paramilitary units,[17] as seen in Sudan’s civil war. This test holds that a state coordinating and supporting a group’s military actions establishes a strong link, making the state responsible, even without specific instructions for individual operations. [18] While fully uncovering the UAE’s and other states’ involvement in Sudan’s war is impossible, the threat of accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide by the SAF and RSF could deter further interference.
Sudan’s civil war has already led to tens of thousands of deaths and the world’s worst humanitarian catastrophe to date, and with no end in sight, ending the conflict must be the priority of the international legal community. A stronger approach to state responsibility for their actions in armed conflicts could be part of the solution.
Emily A. Gwydir is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLVIII.
[1] Press Statement, Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Genocide Determination in Sudan and Imposing Accountability Measures (Jan. 7, 2025), https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures/.
[2] US Says Sudan’s RSF Committed Genocide, Announces Sanctions on Leaders, Aljazeera (Jan. 7, 2025), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/7/us-says-sudans-rsf-committed-genocide-announces-sanctions-on-leaders.
[3] Cameron Hudson & Michelle Strucke, Sudan’s Humanitarian Crisis: What Was Old Is New Again, CSIS (Dec. 17, 2024), https://www.csis.org/analysis/sudans-humanitarian-crisis-what-was-old-new-again; Sudan Emergency, World Food Programme, https://www.wfp.org/emergencies/sudan-emergency#:~:text=A%20total%20of%2024.3 %20million,threshold%20for%20a%20famine%20confirmation (last visited Feb. 15, 2025).
[4] Sudan: New Mass Ethnic Killings, Pillage in Darfur, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 26, 2023, 10:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/11/26/sudan-new-mass-ethnic-killings-pillage-darfur; Sudan: Fighters Rape Women and Girls, Hold Sex Slaves, Human Rights Watch (Dec. 15, 2024, 11:00 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/12/15/sudan-fighters-rape-women-and-girls-hold-sex-slaves.
[5] Michael M. Phillips & Nicholas Bariyo, U.S. Declares Genocide in Sudan. Critics Say Biden Acted Too Late., Wall Street Journal (Jan. 9, 2025, 7:00 A.M.), https://www.wsj.com/world/africa/u-s-declares-genocide-in-sudan-critics-say-biden-acted-too-late-3788a9c9.
[6] Nicholas Casey, Inside the Mountain Stronghold of an Elusive Rebel Movement, New York Times (Aug. 8, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/08/magazine/sudan-nuba-war.html.
[7] Upholding Press Freedom Amidst Conflict in Sudan, UNESCO (Jun. 18, 2024), https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/upholding-press-freedom-amidst-conflict-sudan#:~:text=The%20RSF%20militia%20and%20other,lives%20in%20search%20of%20safety.
[8] Sudan: NGOs Call on the EU to Urgently Act at One Year of Conflict, Amnesty International (Apr. 11, 2024), https://www.amnesty.eu/news/sudan-ngos-call-on-the-eu-to-urgently-act-at-one-year-of-conflict/#:~:text=Many%20human%20rights%20defenders%20have,have%20also%20suffered%20significant%20losses.
[9] Emadeddin Badi, Sudan Is Caught in a Web of External Interference. So Why Is an International Response Still Lacking? Atlantic Council (Dec. 17, 2024), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/sudan-rsf-saf-uae-intervention/.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Husam Mahjoub, It’s an Open Secret: The UAE Is Fueling Sudan’s War – And There’ll Be No Peace Until We Call It Out, The Guardian (May 24, 2024, 6:00 A.M.), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/may/24/uae-sudan-war-peace-emirates-uk-us-officials; see Sudan: Closed Consultations, Security Council Report (Apr. 28, 2024), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2024/04/sudan-private-meeting.php.
[13] Khartoum Again Accuses UAE of Supporting Rapid Support Forces, Middle East Monitor (Oct. 15, 2024), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20241015-khartoum-again-accuses-uae-of-supporting-rapid-support-forces/.
[14] Patricia Zengerle, Exclusive: Biden to Report to US Congress on UAE Assurance It Is Not Supplying Weapons to Sudan RSF, Reuters (Dec. 19, 2024, 8:57 P.M.), https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-report-us-congress-uae-assurance-it-is-not-supplying-weapons-sudan-rsf-2024-12-19/.
[15] Patricia Zengerle, US Lawmakers Seek to Halt Weapons Sales to UAE, Citing Sudan, Reuters (Nov. 21, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/us-lawmakers-seek-halt-weapons-sales-uae-citing-sudan-2024-11-21/.
[16]Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadic Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 Eur. J. Int’l L. 4, 655 – 657 (2007).
[17] Id. at 657, referencing Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 120, 131, 137 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999).
[18] Id. at 657.
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.