Who Speaks for Myanmar? The UN’s Response to Competing Claims of Governance.

The United Nations Credentials Committee has been deferring its decision to make a definitive call on whether to recognize Myanmar’s former democratically elected party as its representative or, instead, to recognize the current military junta’s representation.[1] Right now, the UN ambassador to Myanmar is Kyaw Moe Tun, who has been serving since 2020 and was appointed by the previous civilian government.[2] But, Myanmar’s current government, the State Administration Council (“SAC”), has been seeking to be recognized as the legitimate representative of Myanmar at the UN.[3] This decision is indicative of the struggle that the United Nations faces when there are disputed changes of power within member states. 

In November 2020, Myanmar had its first democratic election since 2015 where the National League for Democracy (“NLD”) won majority seats in both legislative chambers, which signaled a promising change from the former military dominated government.[4] Despite the free and fair election, the military-aligned Union Solidarity and Development Part (“USDP”) tried to contest the results, and the military warned the new government that if the pro-military Constitution was not followed, it would be revoked.[5] Shortly after, in February 2021, the military seized power of the government and is still in control today despite opposition efforts of civilians and the National Unity Government (“NUG”).[6] Myanmar continues to be in the midst of humanitarian and economic crises, and the coup is still widely contested internationally.[7] In fact, in December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2669 which condemned Myanmar’s military abuses and attacks on civilians after its coup, calling on the government to release prisoners, restore a more democratic society, and engage in dialogue with the UN.[8] Further, in April 2024, during a UN Security Council meeting responding to the “abysmal human rights situation,” the council called for restricting Myanmar’s access to jet fuel, but members such as China and Russia were opposed to further consideration of embargoes.[9] Alas, despite the discussion of Myanmar’s struggles, the UN has failed to take a strong stance on the issue of representation.[10]

UN accreditation would allow either the SAC or the NUG to fully participate in the UN, and critics argue that the UN is furthering the crises in Myanmar by delaying their decision.[11] If the UN credits the SAC, they would be embracing a repressive government and setting an example that military coups are acceptable, but it would also give them direct communication to the current government and allow for dialogue that could lead to positive impact on the ground. On the other hand, if the UN credits the NUG, it takes a symbolic stance against recognizing repressive regimes, but will have no real ties to any governmental authorities on the ground in Myanmar, thus limiting its ability to work in tandem with local authorities to help civilians. Thus, the decision the UN is dealing with hinges upon whether it is more important for them to make a symbolic statement against repression or to prioritize open dialogue with members states.  Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar Thomas Andrews has taken a strong stance against legitimizing the SAC and urged member states to enforce coordinated sanctions in order to support the NUG.[12] While dialogue with member states is important, it is also not guaranteed that the SAC will cooperate with the UN even if they do have communication, as demonstrated when they failed to comply with Resolution 2669.[13] Thus, the UN should choose to formally credit the NUG to bolster its claim and set an example of disproval of any such illegitimate, repressive regime.

Alexandra Haggerty is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLVIII. 

[1] Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, Briefing Paper: Myanmar’s Representation in the UN (Aug. 2021), https://specialadvisorycouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/SAC-M-Briefing-Paper-Myanmars-Representation-in-the-UN-ENGLISH.pdf.

[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kyaw Moe, National Unity Government of Myanmar, https://mofa.nugmyanmar.org/mr-kyaw-moe-tun/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2025).

[3] Special Advisory Council for Myanmar, supra note 1.

[4] 2021 Myanmar Coup d'État, Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/2021-Myanmar-coup-d-etat (last visited Feb. 8, 2025).

[5] Id.

[6] Id.

[7] Id.

[8] John Sifton, UN Shows Conflicting Approaches to Myanmar Crisis, Human Rights Watch, (Apr. 4, 2024), https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/04/un-shows-conflicting-approaches-myanmar-crisis.

[9] Id.

[10] Id.

[11] Sarah El Sirgany, Who Represents Myanmar? UN Faces Credentials Pressure at Assembly, Al Jazeera (Sept. 16, 2022), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/16/who-represents-myanmar-un-faces-credentials-pressure-at-assembly.

[12] UN News, Deny legitimacy of Myanmar’s military junta, UN expert urges (Jan. 10, 2023), https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/01/1133027.

[13] Sifton, supra note 8.

This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.