The Windsor Framework and the Future of the Northern Irish Border
The United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) reached a new trade agreement, called the Windsor Framework, for Northern Ireland. The deal seeks to protect the EU’s customs laws while maintaining the unity of the UK. The Windsor Framework comes just two years after the Northern Ireland Protocol, a previous agreement on the issue, took effect.[1] The new agreement builds on the protocol and attempts to deal with its most unpopular provisions.
The Northern Irish border has been one of the most difficult issues to resolve since Britain voted to leave the EU in 2016.[2] For decades, Northern Ireland was mired in sectarian violence between unionists, who wished to remain part of the UK, and nationalists, who wanted unification with Ireland.[3] The violence ended in 1998 with the Good Friday Agreement, which enabled Northern Ireland to remain in the UK while maintaining an open border with Ireland.[4] This relationship worked well when both countries were members of the EU, but post-Brexit, the situation has become more complicated. The complications stem from the EU’s various customs requirements for goods entering from non-EU countries, which include additional paperwork and border checks.[5] EU officials insist that these inspections and document checks for products entering from the UK are necessary to protect their single economic market.[6] However, some in the UK fear that this “hard” border with checkpoints and cameras between Ireland and Northern Ireland could reignite sectarian violence.[7]
Under the Northern Ireland Protocol, customs checks took place at Northern Irish ports in order to keep the border open.[8] This gave the EU control over its borders; however, it effectively created a border within the UK itself. Goods from the rest of the UK were subjected to customs checks as if they were from a foreign country.[9] British businesses complained of additional costs and delays when shipping products to Northern Ireland, and some stopped shipping goods to Northern Ireland altogether.[10] Moreover, to comply with EU regulations, certain imports from Britain, such as chilled meats, were banned in Northern Ireland.[11] These rules enraged Northern Irish Unionists, for whom remaining part of the UK is a top priority. Unionists argued the setup threatened the unity of the UK, comparing it to if there were required checks for goods sent to California from the rest of the United States.[12] To demonstrate their disapproval, unionist parties have boycotted the Northern Ireland assembly.[13] Despite Unionist disapproval, Northern Ireland has remained mostly peaceful, even though some feared that these trade laws could reignite the violence that has not been seen for a quarter century.[14] Furthermore, along with Northern Irish Unionists, Brexit hardliners disapproved of the Northern Ireland Protocol, because they saw it as a way for the EU to retain power over part of the UK.[15] Under the agreement, the European Court of Justice had the power to interpret EU law, some of which still applied to Northern Ireland.[16]
The Windsor Framework attempts to respond to these concerns. Under the new agreement, there are two lanes for goods arriving in Northern Ireland from the rest of the UK. Products destined for Northern Ireland will go through a green lane, which eliminates most checks and paperwork.[17] Products bound for the EU will go through a red lane, which keeps the checks in place.[18] A new registration system for shippers and commercial transit data, shared by the UK and EU, will help ensure that goods reach their proper destination.[19] Ideally, this setup will protect the EU’s economic market while removing divisions within the UK. Additionally, the agreement will remove bans on products, such as chilled meats, and reduce Northern Ireland’s need to comply with EU regulatory and tax laws.[20] The deal will also minimize the role of the European Court of Justice.[21] Finally, the Northern Ireland Assembly, the lawmaking body in Northern Ireland, can now object to EU laws that apply to the country. Once the assembly objects, the new rule cannot be implemented.[22]
Britain must vote on the new deal, and it will likely win in parliament.[23] However, Northern Irish Unionists have yet to weigh in on the agreement, and their opinion will likely have an influence on the stance taken by Brexit hardliners.[24] Thus, while there is potential that the Windsor Framework could be a long-term solution for the Northern Irish border, it still has a long way to go.
Adam Cooper is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume XLVI.
[1] Tom Edgington & Tamara Kovacevic, Brexit: What are the Northern Ireland Protocol and Windsor Framework?, BBC, https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-53724381 (last visited Feb. 28, 2023).
[2] Stephen Castle et al., What’s at Stake in Northern Ireland Trade Deal, N.Y. Times (Mar. 22, 2023), https://www.nytimes.com/article/northern-ireland-protocol-brexit.html.
[3] Id.
[4] Explainer: What is the Good Friday Agreement and when was it signed?, Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/what-is-good-friday-agreement-when-was-it-signed-2023-02-23/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2023)
[5] Edgington & Kovacevic, supra note 1.
[6] Castle et al., supra note 2.
[7] Edgington & Kovacevic, supra note 1.
[8] Id.
[9] Castle et al., supra note 2.
[10] Id.
[11] Id.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Shawn Pogatchnik, Brexit deadlock in Northern Ireland risks rekindling violence, experts warn, POLITICO (Dec. 7, 2022), https://www.politico.eu/article/brexit-deadlock-trade-northern-ireland-protocol-rekindling-violence-expert/.
[15] Castle et al., supra note 2.
[16] Edgington & Kovacevic, supra note 1.
[17] Northern Ireland Brexit deal: At-a-glance, BBC (Feb. 27, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-64790193.
[18] Id.
[19] Castle et al., supra note 2.
[20] See Northern Ireland Brexit deal, supra note 17.
[21] Castle et al., supra note 2.
[22] Jayne McCormack, Brexit: What is the Stormont brake?, BBC (Feb. 28, 2023), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-64795902.
[23] Castle et al., supra note 2.
[24] Id.
This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.