AP I and the Legality of Striking Civilian Infrastructure

On March 21, 2026, President Trump took to Truth Social to post that the United States would “hit and obliterate [Iran’s] various POWER PLANTS, STARTING WITH THE BIGGEST ONE FIRST!” if Iran did not end its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.[i] The biggest power plant in Iran—the Damavand Combined Cycle Power Plant—was never attacked.[ii] The remainder of this piece will examine whether such an attack would have cleared two important bars to legality under international law.

Like many aspects of our law in the U.S., assessing the legality of strikes on civilian facilities is a fact-dependent inquiry, and the line between lawful and unlawful targets can be a murky one. The baseline rule—known as “the principle of distinction”—is discussed in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (known as “AP I”), which states the following:

[T]he Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their operations only against military objectives.[iii]

While there are a number of steps to assess whether an attack is lawful, the most foundational of these is to determine whether the target is a “military objective.” If the answer is no, then the attack is unlawful.[iv] A “Military Objective” for purposes of this analysis is defined as follows:

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.[v]

The “effective contribution” prong, as it is known, requires a non-speculative connection between the object and the enemy’s military actions.[vi] Specifically, the “use” criterion is a primary means through which civilian objects can become legitimate military targets. An object makes an effective contribution by “use” when it is currently being used to support military actions, even if most of its output is for civilian consumption.[vii] 

The “Definite Military Advantage” prong requires that the partial or complete neutralization of an object offers a concrete, rather than speculative or hypothetical, military advantage.[viii] And the neutralization of the target must offer an advantage based on the circumstances at the time of the attack. This caveat is important because it protects objects from strikes that at one time were used for a military purpose but are no longer being so used.[ix]

Here, information about whether Iran’s military uses power generated by its largest power plant is conflicting.  The facility is located near the Parchin military complex, a chemical and explosives facility—circumstantial evidence supporting the idea that it provides an effective contribution to military action.[x] Some have inferred from military reports of Iran launching drones and ballistic missiles from populated areas that its military uses the same grid as civilians,[xi] while others have argued that Iran’s military has “only limited ties with the national electricity system.”[xii]  Overall, it seems plausible that the facility provides at least some contribution to the Iranian war effort, although it is hard to say with any degree of certainty. It is similarly difficult to conclude that the destruction of the Damavand Plant would provide a definite military advantage.

Regardless of whether the facility is a legitimate military objective in a vacuum, an attack on it would need to satisfy the rule of proportionality, which requires that any incidental injury to civilians not be excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage of the strike.[xiii] The attacker must consider reasonably foreseeable downstream effects of the strike, including civilian death, injury, or illness.[xiv]

Here, while the Damavand Plant is the largest in Iran—capable of powering more than two million homes[xv]—it provides only 2.9% of the country’s total generating capacity.[xvi] Following strikes on the electricity grid in July 2026, Tehran hospitals were mostly shielded by backup power systems.[xvii] Water in the vicinity of the plant depends on electricity, and outages in 2025 caused water cuts of four to fourteen hours.[xviii]

Against this backdrop, there is not enough publicly available information to call this potential strike unlawful based on disproportionality. Iran’s decentralized power grid means that a strike against the Damavand Plant would probably not result in enough civilian harm to render it unlawful based on the rule of proportionality.[xix] This is not to say, however, that strikes against all of Iran’s power plants would be legal, as the civilian harm from a nationwide campaign would be far more difficult to justify.[xx]


Matthew P. Luhrsen is a staff member of Fordham International Law Journal Volume L.

[i] Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Truth Social (Mar. 21, 2026, at 7:44 PM), https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/116269822349947644.

[ii] See Marium Ali, Where Are Iran’s Power Plants That Trump Has Threatened to Destroy?, Al Jazeera (Apr. 6, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/4/6/where-are-irans-power-plants-that-trump-has-threatened-to-destroy (identifying Damavand as Iran’s largest power plant).

[iii] Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 48, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I].

[iv] See AP I, supra note 3, art. 52(1)–(2); Michael N. Schmitt, When Civilian Infrastructure Becomes a Lawful Target, Just Sec. (July 23, 2026), https://www.justsecurity.org/148907/civilian-infrastructure-becomes-lawful-target/.

[v] AP I, supra note 3, art. 52(2); accord 1 Jean-Marie Henckaerts & Louise Doswald-Beck, Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law r. 8 (2005).

[vi] See Schmitt, supra note 4; Off. of Gen. Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Department of Defense Law of War Manual § 5.6.6.2 (June 2015, updated July 2023) [hereinafter DoD Law of War Manual].

[vii] Schmitt, supra note 4; see also DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 6, §§ 5.6.1.2, 5.6.6.1.

[viii] DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 6, § 5.6.7.3; see also Schmitt, supra note 4.

[ix] See AP I, supra note 3, art. 52(2); Schmitt, supra note 4.

[x] See Parchin Military Complex, Nuclear Threat Initiative, https://www.nti.org/education-center/facilities/parchin-military-complex/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2026); Ali, supra note 2.

[xi] See Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., There May Be Legal Basis for Striking Parts of Iran’s Electrical Grid, but Not for Having a “Whole Civilization . . . Die,” Lawfire (Apr. 8, 2026), https://sites.duke.edu/lawfire/2026/04/08/there-may-be-legal-bases-for-striking-parts-of-irans-electrical-grid-but-they-dont-include-having-a-whole-civilization-die/.

[xii] Joseph Webster & Ginger Matchett, Why US-Israeli Attacks on Iran’s Grid and Water Systems Would Be Counterproductive, Atlantic Council (Apr. 6, 2026), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/why-us-israeli-attacks-on-irans-systems-would-be-counterproductive/.

[xiii] AP I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5, r. 14; DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 6, § 5.12.

[xiv] Schmitt, supra note 4; see also DoD Law of War Manual, supra note 6, § 5.12.1.3 (requiring consideration of foreseeable, but not remote, harms, and using a power plant serving a hospital as an example).

[xv] Where Are Iran’s Power Plants, supra note 2.

[xvi] Ben Aris, Iran’s Electric Grid Is One of the Most Decentralised in the World, IntelliNews (Mar. 27, 2026), https://www.intellinews.com/iran-s-electric-grid-is-one-of-the-most-decentralised-in-the-world-434056/.

[xvii] Rasol Alhaei, Iranians Suffer from Power Blackouts During War and Heatwave, Al Jazeera (July 19, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/19/iranians-suffer-from-power-blackouts-during-war-and-heatwave.

[xviii] Widespread Power Outages Hit Most Iranian Cities, Including All of Tehran Province, Nat’l Iranian Am. Council (May 8, 2025), https://niacouncil.org/widespread-power-outages-hit-most-iranian-cities-including-all-of-tehran-province/.

[xix] See Aris, supra note 16.

[xx] See AP I, supra note 3, art. 51(5)(b); Henckaerts & Doswald-Beck, supra note 5, r. 14.


This is a student blog post and in no way represents the views of the Fordham International Law Journal.